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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Theodor Seuss Geisel, more popularly known as Dr. Seuss, published The Butter 
Battle Book on March 2, 19841 in response to U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s 
escalation of the nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union, a policy that he characterized 
as evincing “deadly stupidity.”2 While the book received significant criticism when 
first published,3 it also received considerable praise. Writer and illustrator Maurice 
Sendak remarked: “Surprisingly, wonderfully, the case for total disarmament has been 
brilliantly made by our acknowledged master of nonsense, Dr. Seuss. . . . Only a 
genius of the ridiculous could possibly deal with the cosmic and lethal madness of the 
nuclear arms race.”4 Civil rights leader Coretta Scott King also praised the work, 
stating: “May the wisdom of this book help parents double their efforts for world 
peace, and may its wit help children forgive us our foolish antagonisms.”5 The 
supporters won out, as Geisel received a Pulitzer Prize the same year.6 History also 
proved to be on Seuss’s side, as the book was extremely successful and translated into 
more languages than any other Seuss book.7
 While certainly a powerful critique of nuclear arms proliferation, The Butter 
Battle Book is perhaps even more valuable for its description of how societies progress 
toward armed conflict. This article examines that process through an international 
legal framework, questioning when—and even whether—international law generally, 
or international humanitarian law specifically, could intervene as two states march 
toward self-annihilation. This article argues that current international law fails to 
prevent states from reaching such military standoffs. To address this failing, it calls 
1. Donald E. Pease, Theodor SEUSS Geisel 145 (2010).
2. Judith Morgan & Neil Morgan, Dr. Seuss and Mr. Geisel: A Biography 81 (1995); see also 
Hillard Harper, The Private World of Dr. Seuss: A Visit to Theodor Geisel ’s La Jolla Mountaintop, in Of 
Sneetches and Whos and the Good Dr. Seuss: Essays on the Writings and Life of Theodor 
Geisel 129, 133 (Thomas Fensch ed., 1997) (noting that Seuss called The Butter Battle Book “an attack 
on the arms race”).
3. Thomas Fensch, The Man Who Was Dr. Seuss: The Life and Work of Theodor Geisel 170 
(2000); Pease, supra note 1, at 147; Alison Lurie, The Cabinet of Dr. Seuss, in Of Sneetches and 
Whos and the Good Dr. Seuss: Essays on the Writings and Life of Theodor Geisel, supra 
note 2, at 155, 159 (noting that The Butter Battle Book received unfavorable comments by The New York 
Times Book Review and The New Republic upon publication); Morgan & Morgan, supra note 2, at 254 
(noting that The Butter Battle Book aroused “public opinion and controversy”).
4. Fensch, supra note 3, at 169; Morgan & Morgan, supra note 2, at 252 (noting that Sendak’s laudatory 
statement was withheld from the initial printing of the book, but that it was included in subsequent 
printings).
5. Philip Nel, Dr. Seuss: American Icon 193 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. 1984 Winner and Finalists, The Pulitzer Prizes, http://www.pulitzer.org/awards/1984 (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2014) (noting that Geisel received a Pulitzer Prize “[f]or his special contribution over nearly 
half a century to the education and enjoyment of America’s children and their parents”).
7. Pease, supra note 1, at 147. The film adaptation aired across the Soviet Union on New Year’s Day 1990, 
leading Seuss to joke that his book ended the Cold War. See id.; Fensch, supra note 3, at 173 (noting 
that The Butter Battle Book reached number one on the New York Times best-seller list and sold one 
million copies in the first year after its publication).
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for a progressive international law concerned foremost with human dignity and 
global citizenship, and less so with strong state sovereignty.
 Part II provides a concise history of the Yook-Zook conf lict, examining the 
conflict’s root cause, its escalation, and its unresolved conclusion. Part III discusses 
international law in relation to the Yook-Zook conf lict. Focusing on the U.N. 
Charter and international humanitarian law, this Part addresses whether an armed 
conflict exists, the crime of aggression, and the legality of nuclear weapons. Part IV 
discusses a more fundamental problem that the Yook-Zook conflict illustrates: the 
construction of “otherness.” This Part examines the process of constructing the other 
in relation to international law. In addition, this Part asks how a more progressive 
international law could address the problem of otherness by looking to the Global 
Peoples Assembly proposed by international law professors Richard Falk and Andrew 
Strauss and the jurisprudential approach of Christopher Weeramantry, a former 
judge of the International Court of Justice, as possible solutions. Part V concludes.
ii. a COnCisE histOrY Of thE YOOK-zOOK COnfLiCt
 This Part discusses the conflict’s root cause, escalation, and unresolved conclusion.
 A. Approaches to Buttering: The Root Cause of the Conflict
 The Butter Battle Book begins with a resigned, older individual leading a curious or 
perhaps startled child up a hill with the somewhat ominous phrase, “On the last day 
of summer, ten hours before fall . . .” trailing off as an unfinished statement.8 On the 
following page, the perspective widens, revealing a large wall that divides a bucolic 
green landscape with virtually identical pink-roofed houses on either side of the wall. 
Continuing the narrative, the child states, “. . . my grandfather took me to the Wall.” 
After standing silent before the wall, Grandfather sadly shakes his head and tells the 
child, “As you know, on this side of the Wall we are Yooks. On the far other side of 
this Wall live the Zooks.” After pausing, he continues, “It’s high time you knew of the 
terribly horrible thing that Zooks do. In every Zook house and in every Zook town 
every Zook eats his bread with the butter side down!” Indeed, on the following page, two 
Zooks, looking remarkably similar to Yooks, are enjoying their bread butter side 
down. In the background, a banner proclaims “Butter Side DOWN!” The next page 
depicts the child and Grandfather next to the wall, demonstrating that it is nearly 
three times Grandfather’s height. Nailed to the wall is a poster that reads, “YOOKS 
are Not Zooks. Keep Your BUTTER SIDE UP!” Over the wall, several innocuous-
looking Zook houses are visible. Against this backdrop, Grandfather states, “But we 
Yooks, as you know, when we breakfast or sup, spread our bread with the butter side 
up. That’s the right, honest way!” Gritting his teeth, Grandfather concludes, “So you 
can’t trust a Zook who spreads bread underneath! Every Zook must be watched! He 
has kinks in his soul! That’s why, as a youth, I made watching my goal, watching 
Zooks for the Zook-Watching Border Patrol!”
8. Dr. Seuss, The Butter Battle Book (1984). All descriptions, references, and quotations within this 
article refer to this text.
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 In these few lines, Grandfather succinctly describes the seemingly trivial, but also 
seemingly irresolvable conflict that ultimately threatens both Yook and Zook society: 
whether one butters his or her bread on the top or on the bottom. At the same time, 
the imagery suggests the commonality of these peoples, as the Yooks and the Zooks 
look quite similar and live in nearly identical homes within the same landscape of tall 
purple trees and rolling green hills. Despite these commonalities, the entrenchment 
of the conflict is clear. The wall is the most obvious symbol of the conflict and it 
creates a physical barrier that separates these two peoples. The wall also acts as a 
mental and emotional barrier by contributing to an exclusionary mentality that keeps 
other viewpoints out. As Grandfather notes, to ensure that the wall remains 
unbreached, tactics of surveillance (a border patrol) are necessary. These tactics 
contribute to viewing those on the outside not as different, but as untrustworthy and 
ultimately as other. As the conflict intensifies, so too does the need to exclude. Perhaps 
in response, the wall increases in size. Keeping the border safe becomes paramount 
and no one questions the underlying rationale for erecting the barrier. Indeed, as the 
conflict intensifies, questioning the wall is likely tantamount to treason. Propaganda 
is also important to sustaining the conflict. Displayed both publicly on the Yook side 
of the wall and privately within the Zook home, propaganda contributes to an 
internalized and reactive opposition between the Yooks and the Zooks.
 B. The Yook-Zook Conflict
 The Yook-Zook conflict contains three distinct phases: an escalating arms race 
marked by technological advancement and increasingly sophisticated weapons, the 
development of a nuclear or atomic weapon that threatens to destroy both the Yooks 
and the Zooks, and an unresolved conclusion, as Grandfather Yook and his longtime 
Zook adversary VanItch engage in a final struggle both possessing a weapon capable 
of total destruction.
  1. An Escalating Arms Race
 After explaining the conflict’s root cause, Grandfather tells his grandson the 
conflict’s history, which the reader sees through a series of events in Grandfather’s 
past. This series begins with a youthful Grandfather patrolling the Yook-Zook 
border with his “tough-tufted prickly Snick-Berry Switch,” noting, “in those days, of 
course, the Wall wasn’t so high and I could look any Zook square in the eye.” Striding 
alongside the wall, Grandfather stares menacingly at two Zooks across the border 
before “a very rude Zook by the name of VanItch” destroys his Snick-Berry Switch 
with a slingshot, thus beginning the escalation of the Yook-Zook conflict.
 The employment of increasingly destructive weapons drives the conf lict’s 
escalation, as Grandfather and VanItch encounter one another repeatedly at the wall 
attempting to gain military advantage through superior weaponry. After losing his 
Snick-Berry Switch, Grandfather returns with a Tripper-Sling-Jigger: a rock-
throwing device. VanItch counters with a Jigger-Rock Snatchem: a device that 
catches rocks and then launches them back at the firing party. Grandfather then 
621
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 58 | 2013/14
introduces a “newfangled kind of gun,” the Kick-a-Poo-Kid, which VanItch counters 
with an Eight-Nozzled, Elephant-Toted Boom-Blitz. Finally, Yook military 
leadership excitedly tells Grandfather that he is going to begin the Big War by f lying 
over the wall in the Utterly Sputter, a “great new machine” that will sprinkle Blue 
Goo all over the Zooks. Reaching the wall, Grandfather finds VanItch in his own 
Utterly Sputter, taunting “if Yooks can goo Zooks, you’d better forget it. ‘Cause 
Zooks can goo Yooks!” Threatened by reciprocal destruction, Grandfather retreats, 
resulting in a stalemate between the Yooks and Zooks.
 While the military encounters between Grandfather and VanItch occur at the 
wall, the secretive and largely unseen Boys in the Back Room are responsible for 
creating the weapons that Grandfather and VanItch employ. As the technology 
advances, the destructive capabilities of the weapons become greater and less 
predictable—thus the potential for collateral damage increases. As Grandfather 
notes of the Utterly Sputter: “This machine was so modern, so frightfully new, no one 
knew quite exactly just what it would do.” In addition, as the conflict intensifies the 
Yooks and the Zooks become more willing to inflict greater destruction, escalating 
from sticks to rocks to guns to finally the Utterly Sputter’s Blue Goo that suggests 
chemical warfare. Of course, the ends of technology are determined by the means of 
those directing its use. Here, Yook leadership, represented by the Chief Yookeroo, 
relies solely on military superiority to resolve the conflict.9 Indeed, technology serves 
no purpose in this text other than to defeat an enemy. Moreover, Chief Yookeroo 
makes no effort toward negotiating a peaceful resolution to the conflict and places 
the blame entirely on the Zooks, telling Grandfather after his first encounter with 
VanItch that “those Zooks will be sorry they started this game.”
  2. The Nuclear Option
 After the Utterly Sputter stalemate, the conf lict’s tone changes dramatically. 
When Grandfather meets Chief Yookeroo a final time, the Yook office is in disarray. 
Discarded papers cover the f loor and desk, while an overflowing trash can and wilted 
f lowers add to the chaotic appearance. The office walls are now a dull gray, while 
previously they were light green. The Chief is much less enthusiastic than he was 
during Grandfather’s previous visits. There are no smiles or laughter, no new 
uniforms and no promotions. Grandfather looks haggard, holding onto the doorframe 
for strength. Nonetheless, the Chief reassures Grandfather, telling him to “[h]ave no 
fears,” and insisting that “[e]verything is all right.”
 Again, the Chief trusts technology above all else. The Bright Back Room Boys, 
working from the “Top-est Secret-est Brain Nest,” have replaced the Boys in the 
Back Room and have invented the Bitsy Big-Boy Boomeroo. Filled with “mysterious 
Moo-Lacka-Moo,” the Chief promises Grandfather that it “can blow all those Zooks 
clear to Sala-ma-goo.” The Chief, now clearly older, uses a long extension device to 
9. For example, after VanItch destroys Grandfather’s Snick-Berry Switch, Chief Yookeroo promises him a 
“fancier slingshot to shoot!” When this strategy fails, he notes that slingshots are “old-fashioned stuff ” 
before providing Grandfather the Kick-a-Poo-Kid.
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give Grandfather the Boomeroo while standing behind a protective partition. He 
then commands Grandfather to “ just run to the wall like a nice little man. Drop this 
bomb on the Zooks just as fast as you can.” Meanwhile, he has “ordered all Yooks to 
stay safe underground while the Bitsy Big-Boy Boomeroo is around.”10
 C. End Game
 The story then returns to the present and the grandson reclaims the narrative. 
Back at the wall, Grandfather holds the Boomeroo in one hand and his grandson’s 
hand in the other. Looking irritably at his grandson, Grandfather is initially upset 
that his grandson is here and not in the protected Yookery, but he then reconsiders 
and welcomes his grandson’s presence to see him make history. Grandfather stands 
on top of the wall ready to drop the Boomeroo, before VanItch once again emerges 
to thwart his plans. Surprising Grandfather, he reaches the top of the wall holding 
his own Boomeroo. Grandfather and VanItch face each other, separated by inches 
and holding Boomeroos, as the shocked grandson looks on from a tree. Having again 
lost his advantage, Grandfather appears more timid, and looks not directly at 
VanItch—who stares directly and menacingly at Grandfather—but also toward his 
grandson. Terrified, the grandson shouts: “Be careful. Oh, gee! Who’s going to drop 
it? Will you . . . ? Or will he . . . ?” Trying to regain control of the situation, 
Grandfather replies, “Be patient . . . . We’ll see. We will see . . . .”
 The very last page of the text is blank, which could represent the destruction and 
erasure of both the Yooks and the Zooks. More optimistically, the blank page allows 
the reader to imagine a more constructive or peaceful ending. Indeed, literary and 
cultural critic Donald Pease suggests that the blank page is not “an open ending,” but 
“the site where a new history can begin after the child turns the page on the 
grandfather’s history.”11 The use of an ellipsis is significant. Children’s literature 
scholar Ruth MacDonald notes that Seuss typically used ellipses to urge the reader 
onto the next page, as the ellipsis functioned as a “cliff-hanger . . . assisting the 
forward, rightward movement of the book and the pictures.”12 Here, however, there 
is no next page. Rather, “this is the end of the book, and the final page is on the left, 
facing a blank right page.”13 MacDonald asks whether this ending indicates total 
10. At this point in the narrative, the Yook-Zook conflict clearly parallels the development of the atomic 
bomb in the United States. As the Chief again places military superiority over all other considerations, 
he praises his Bright Back Room Boys as “brighter than bright” for inventing a gadget that is “Newer 
than New.” The cautionary actions of the Chief and the Bright Back Room Boys in the presence of the 
Boomeroo illustrate its danger. Having created a military device that mirrors the destructive capacity of 
an atomic or nuclear weapon, the Bright Back Room Boys working in the Top-est Secret-est Brain Nest 
stand in for the Manhattan Project scientists at Los Alamos. Similarly, the “Bitsy Big-Boy Boomeroo” 
perhaps references the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki: “Little Boy” and “Fat Man.” 
Finally, the line of Yooks making their way to “Your Yookery,” an underground bomb shelter, ref lects 
the worst-case scenario of the Cold War.
11. Pease, supra note 1, at 147.
12. Ruth K. MacDonald, Dr. Seuss 155 (1988).
13. Id. 
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destruction, or is instead like the conclusion to The Lorax, where the blank page 
presents an opportunity for the reader to imagine change.14
iii. intErnatiOnaL LaW and thE YOOK-zOOK COnfLiCt
 Part II provided a concise history of the Yook-Zook conflict. This Part examines 
whether current international law allows for intervention in this or a similar conflict 
and what legal issues might frustrate intervention. Here, intervention refers not 
necessarily to force, but to external action that would prevent two states from 
engaging in armed conflict, particularly the use of nuclear weapons or, in the Yook-
Zook context, Bitsy Big-Boy Boomeroos. Specifically, this Part looks to states’ rights 
and obligations afforded by the U.N. Charter and international humanitarian law as 
the two bodies of law best situated to prevent the escalation of conflict and the use of 
nuclear weapons. This Part concludes that international law—specifically the 
international treaty process, international humanitarian law, and International Court 
of Justice jurisprudence—fails to prevent the escalation of conf lict or the use of 
nuclear weapons.
 A. International Law and the U.N. Charter
 International law governs the conduct of states.15 Under international law, states 
enjoy specific rights and have specific obligations. Within modern public international 
law, the U.N. Charter is the key legal text that describes these rights and obligations.16 
The preamble to the charter provides two important points that apply to the Yook-
Zook conf lict. First, the charter seeks “to save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war[,]” and second, the charter requires member states “to practice 
tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours.”17
 Within the charter, several articles apply to the Yook-Zook conflict. Article 1(1) 
is perhaps the most applicable, as it requires member states:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, 
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, 
and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles 
of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international 
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace[.]18
Articles 2(3) and 2(4) are also applicable. Article 2(3) states: “All Members shall 
settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
14. MacDonald also notes that when asked about the ending, Seuss claimed “posing any ending would 
make the book propagandistic and unrealistic as well, since the answer in real life is not at all clear.” Id.
15. International Law, Cornell U. L. Sch. Legal Info. Inst., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
international_law (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
16. See generally U.N. Charter.
17. U.N. Charter pmbl.
18. Id. art. 1, para. 1.
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international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered[,]”19 whereas Article 
2(4) states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”20 In 
addition, Article 33(1) provides: “The parties to any dispute, the continuance of 
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, 
shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other 
peaceful means of their own choice.”21 In addition to these articles, the U.N. Security 
Council could also take action in a Yook-Zook-type conflict through its Chapter VII 
powers, most notably Article 39, which requires the Security Council to “determine 
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and 
to “make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain 
or restore international peace and security.”22
 Two important questions arise. First, as these articles of the U.N. Charter are the 
most relevant to the Yook-Zook conf lict, do these legal provisions allow for 
intervention that could prevent the escalation of conflict or a nuclear attack? Second, 
if these legal provisions do not allow for such intervention, is this outcome attributable 
to the parties (the Yooks and the Zooks), the U.N. Charter, or a combination of 
these and other factors?
 First, consider the preamble. As noted above, the preamble requires member states 
to practice tolerance, live together peacefully, and act as good neighbors. Being tolerant, 
peaceful, and, perhaps above all, a good neighbor requires a spirit of cooperation and 
flexibility that a rigid rights-based approach to law does not typically provide. The 
Yooks and the Zooks exemplify such an approach by blindly exercising their rights 
rather than considering their duties and obligations. For example, when the conflict 
begins, neither the Yooks nor the Zooks engage in diplomatic discussion. Rather, both 
states move immediately to arms escalation and employ military strategies that favor 
belligerence over dialogue. Belligerent legal rhetoric can be understood as an emphatic 
assertion of rights, as such assertions demand recognition of a particular legal right 
regardless of the possible negative outcomes. Such rhetoric denies less aggressive but 
perhaps ultimately more satisfying solutions and attempts to discount or minimize the 
rights of other parties. Here, an actor takes action because he or she can, while 
discounting or perhaps not even considering the consequences. To use a very simplistic 
analogy, a rigid rights-based approach is akin to the child that stops a game to take his 
or her ball and go home, not because the game is unfair, but simply because the child 
does not like the way the game is going. In this example, the child has not broken a 
rule—it is his or her ball—but the child has violated the spirit of fair play and 
cooperation necessary for the game to continue. Similarly, in the Yook-Zook conflict, 
19. Id. art. 2, para. 3.
20. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
21. Id. art. 33, para. 1.
22. Id. art. 39.
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neither side initially violates international law, but the aggressive and uncooperative 
actions of both sides violate the spirit of the U.N. Charter and sets the Yooks and the 
Zooks down a path that dramatically increases the chance of armed conflict, and in 
this example, mutually assured destruction through the exchange of Boomeroos.
 Second, the Yooks, the Zooks, and U.N. member states also fail to meet the 
charter’s legal requirements. Within the Yook-Zook conflict, collective measures to 
prevent and remove threats to peace promulgated by Article 1(1) are clearly absent. 
Likewise, the Yook-Zook conflict is far from the peaceful resolution required by the 
same article. Indeed, at the text’s conclusion, the only resolution that appears likely is 
mutual destruction. Article 2(3) largely reiterates the requirements of Article 1(1), but 
places the burden of peaceful resolution on the member states involved in the dispute, 
which is obviously lacking in this example. The Yooks and the Zooks are also in clear 
violation of Article 2(4), which requires member states to refrain from “the threat or 
use of force.”23 Moreover, Article 33(1) provides a slew of actions that the Yooks and 
the Zooks have not undertaken—“negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other 
peaceful means of their own choice.”24 Thus, the Yooks, the Zooks, and U.N. member 
states have clearly failed to meet their state obligations under these articles.
 While the Yooks and the Zooks have failed to meet their legal obligations to find 
a peaceful resolution to their conflict, U.N. member states and the U.N. Security 
Council do not offer much assistance toward achieving a peaceful resolution or stopping 
the escalation of conflict. Regarding Article 33(1), Security Council intervention 
would require a finding of a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression.”25 In practice, Security Council-approved military action proves to be a 
very difficult standard to satisfy and it is unlikely that the Yook-Zook conflict would 
trigger such action.26 Given that the Yook-Zook conflict has produced no casualties 
23. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
24. Id. art. 33, para. 1.
25. Id. art. 39.
26. To take two recent examples, the current Syrian conflict has resulted in a full-f ledged civil war, over 
135,000 deaths, and the displacement of 9.5 million people. See Anne Barnard & Nick Cumming-Bruce, 
After Second Round of Syria Talks, No Agreement Even on How to Negotiate, N.Y. Times (Feb. 15, 2014), 
http://nyti.ms/1gEx1tG. Similarly, the recent, and perhaps still ongoing Darfur conflict resulted in death, 
destruction, and displacement, including a humanitarian and refugee crisis that continues to cause 
suffering and to produce a destabilizing effect within Sudan and surrounding states. See generally Julie 
Flint & Alex de Waal, Darfur: A New History of a Long War (2d ed. 2008); Brian Steidle & 
Gretchen Steidle Wallace, The Devil Came on Horseback: Bearing Witness to the Genocide 
in Darfur (2007). While the number of deaths remains disputed, the likely number is near 300,000 and 
the conflict remains unresolved. See James Copnall, Darfur Conflict: Sudan’s Bloody Stalemate, BBC News 
(Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22336600. Although bitterly contested, neither 
conflict resulted in Security Council military intervention that attempted to save the lives of Syrian or 
Sudanese citizens. Of course, these conflicts involve an intrastate conflict, whereas the Yook-Zook conflict 
is an interstate conflict. Nonetheless, recent interstate examples such as the 2008 South Ossetia conflict 
also provide little indication that Security Council military intervention would be forthcoming. UN 
Security Council Remains Deadlocked over South Ossetia, Deutsche Welle (Aug. 9, 2008), http://www.
dw.de/un-security-council-remains-deadlocked-over-south-ossetia/a-3550565.
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and no loss of property, except for one Snick-Berry Switch, Security Council military 
intervention is quite doubtful. Finally, while the threat of mutually assured destruction 
via the Boomeroos could provide the Security Council the impetus to act as a clear 
“threat to the peace,” it could just as easily produce the opposite result, where the stakes 
of the conflict serve to reinforce the council’s prevailing reluctance to intervene.
 Thus, while the Yooks and the Zooks do not satisfy the spirit or the letter of the 
U.N. Charter, recent state and U.N. Security Council practice shows that intervention 
to prevent the escalation of armed conflict is unlikely. Accordingly, it is doubtful that 
the U.N. Charter—the bedrock of modern public international law—can prevent the 
escalation of the Yook-Zook conflict. Of course, intervening to stop the escalation of 
conflict likely requires conflict itself, which is self-defeating if the goal is to prevent 
conflict. Nonetheless, the inability of the U.N. system to prevent the escalation of 
conflict is disappointing. This inability illustrates the shortcomings of understanding 
international law primarily as exercising rights and only very distantly as satisfying 
duties or obligations. To return to the neighbor analogy given in the U.N. Charter 
preamble, unlike the Yooks and the Zooks, good neighbors do not react to difference 
by resorting to surveillance, threats, and intimidation. Further, when encountered 
with different cultural practices, good neighbors, if concerned by these practices, 
discuss these concerns civilly. Above all, good neighbors lend a hand and look after 
one another. In contrast, the Yooks and the Zooks demonstrate a rigid rights-based 
legal approach, which pushes these states to—if not over—the threshold of legality. 
At minimum, they are awful neighbors. Whether a more progressive version of 
public international law could better prevent the escalation of conflict and recalibrate 
the balance of rights and duties is explored in Part IV.27
 B. International Humanitarian Law
 While the U.N. Charter provides the general framework for state practice in 
modern public international law, international humanitarian law provides the specific 
legal rules that govern armed conflict, including armed conflict between states. The 
following section examines whether international humanitarian law is more likely to 
prevent the escalation of conflict between the Yooks and the Zooks than international 
law exercised under the U.N. Charter. This section also examines additional legal 
issues that could frustrate intervention.
  1. A Yook-Zook Armed Conflict?
 International humanitarian law regulates the actions of combatants during armed 
conflict with the goals of preventing unnecessary suffering for combatants and limiting 
the negative effects of armed conflict on civilian populations.28 More specifically, 
27. See infra Part IV.
28. See Int’l Comm. Red Cross, What Is International Humanitarian Law? 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf. See, e.g., Sylvain Vité, Typology of Armed 
Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 Int’l Rev. Red 
Cross 69, 70 (2009).
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international humanitarian law provides protections to civilians and combatants no 
longer taking a direct part in the hostilities.29 These protections aid vulnerable 
populations within the conflict, which works to ensure that the goals of preventing 
unnecessary suffering and limiting civilian harm are met.
 The first step in an international humanitarian law analysis is to determine whether 
an armed conflict exists.30 If an armed conflict exists, the next step is to determine 
what type of conflict exists.31 International humanitarian law provides three possible 
characterizations of armed conflict: international armed conflict, non-international 
armed conflict, and internationalized armed conflict. The characterization of the 
conflict is important as different rights and obligations attach to each conflict type. 
The most significant difference arises between an international armed conflict and a 
non-international armed conflict. Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
applies to international conflicts, which includes “declared war” and “any other armed 
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even 
if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.”32 Common Article 2 also applies 
to total or partial occupation of a state’s territory.33 In contrast, Common Article 3 of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions applies to non-international armed conflicts, or more 
accurately “armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of 
one of the High Contracting Parties.”34 Likewise, the First Additional Geneva Protocol 
(1977) supplements Common Article 2 and thus applies to international armed 
conflicts,35 while the Second Additional Geneva Protocol (1977) applies to Common 
Article 3 and applies to non-international armed conflicts.36 While a comprehensive 
assessment of the different rights and obligations applicable to each armed conflict 
29. Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War 202 
(2010).
30. Id. at 149–50.
31. Id.
32. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field, art. 2, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force 
Oct. 21, 1950).
33. Id.
34. Id. art. 3.
35. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 1(3), opened for signature June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Additional Protocol I] (noting that the 
Protocol “which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war 
victims, shall apply in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to those Conventions”).
36. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 1(1), opened for signature June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) (noting that the Protocol “develops and supplements 
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949”).
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type is outside the scope of this article, it is important to note that these differences 
exist and that they shape military and legal responses to armed conflict.37
 Within the Yook-Zook conflict, it is unclear whether international humanitarian 
law would apply, as it is debatable that an armed conflict exists. One could argue that 
VanItch began an international armed conflict by firing his slingshot at Grandfather’s 
Snick-Berry Switch. Not only does VanItch destroy Yook weaponry, but he also fires 
into Yook territory. A military official purposely firing a weapon into a foreign 
territory almost certainly constitutes an act of international armed conflict, at least in 
a strict black letter sense.38 Some commentators argue, however, that a limited military 
exchange across international borders does not necessarily trigger the application of 
international humanitarian law. For example, international humanitarian law scholar 
Gary Solis argues that the use of force alone does not trigger international 
humanitarian law, but that the intent of the states involved in the incident must also 
be considered.39 But, as one commentator notes, Solis’s position seemingly contradicts 
the Commentary to General Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, which makes clear 
that there is not a requisite duration or intensity of hostilities within an international 
armed conflict.40 Indeed, the lack of a minimum threshold of hostilities within an 
international armed conflict is one major distinction between international armed 
conflicts and non-international armed conflicts.41 Nonetheless, Solis provides several 
historical examples to bolster his argument, which is worth considering given the 
importance that state practice has in public international law.42
 Whether an armed conflict exists between the Yooks and the Zooks is ultimately 
indeterminable given the available facts. Still, a legal analysis that finds an armed 
conflict to exist seems doubtful. Accepting Solis’s view would certainly preclude 
finding that the Yook-Zook dispute reaches armed conflict status. International 
humanitarian law only applies once an armed conflict exists, and while finding that 
an armed conflict does or does not exist may do little to alter Yook and Zook actions, 
such a finding could provide more options for a third state or international coalition to 
37. Whether the United States’ sustained cross-border military actions against organizations such as 
al-Qaeda amount to an armed conf lict that triggers the rights and obligations of international 
humanitarian law is a favorite example of this point. See Vité, supra note 28, at 92–93.
38. “There is no need for a formal declaration of war, or for recognition of the existence of a state of war, as 
preliminaries to the application of the Convention. The occurrence of de facto hostilities is sufficient.” 2 
Jean S. Pictet et al., Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Commentary: Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea 28 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Henry trans., 1960).
39. Solis, supra note 29, at 151–52.
40. Eric C. Sigmund, Border Skirmish, No—“International Armed Conflict”, Yes: The Case of Syria and Turkey, 
Human. in the Midst of War (Oct. 6, 2012), http://lawsofarmedconflict.com/2012/10/06/border-
skirmish-no-international-armed-conflict-yes-the-case-of-syria-and-turkey/.
41. Id. (“Unlike situations of non-international armed conflicts—that is internal conflicts (sometimes referred 
to as ‘civil wars’) or conflicts between non-state armed groups—international armed conflicts need not 
reach a minimum threshold of intensity for international humanitarian law to come into effect.”).
42. Solis, supra note 29, at 170–85.
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intervene. Obviously, intervention simply to prevent conflict is difficult and quite 
possibly oxymoronic. Moreover, in recent practice, military interventions, even with 
arguably good intentions, have led to substantial loss of life and the long-term 
occupation of states that previously were not engaged in conflict.43
 This analysis, and its unsatisfactory outcome, illustrates a fundamental f law in 
the ability of international law to prevent the escalation of conf lict. Simply put, 
international humanitarian law is reactive and does not provide for the prevention of 
conflict. Thus, even if a third party could eliminate the Boomeroos that threaten 
Yook and Zook society, to do so would almost certainly violate international law. In 
this sense, international law allows states to stockpile weapons44 and prepare for 
armed conflict, but only allows for intervention once the conflict is underway. If the 
proverbial ounce of prevention is worth a pound of international humanitarian law 
cure after a conflict begins, international law is indeed of little utility in this regard.
  2. The Crime of Aggression
 Defining the crime of aggression with the purpose of making it an internationally 
recognized crime is one possible response to the issues raised above. This legal action 
may not prevent the escalation of the Yook-Zook conflict, but if the penalty is strong 
enough, it may deter similar future conf licts. At the very least, criminalizing 
aggression would provide some measure of accountability for states and individuals 
responsible for beginning armed conflict. Admittedly, accountability after the fact 
likely provides little (if any) consolation for victims of aggression, especially in a Yook-
Zook-type conflict where the loss of life and the destruction caused by an exchange of 
nuclear weapons would obviously outweigh the legal sanction. Nonetheless, some 
accountability for such crimes is better than total unaccountability or impunity.
 The crime of aggression occupies a unique place in the history and development 
of international law. Famously, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
proclaimed that the crime of aggression is “the supreme international crime.”45 The 
tribunal reasoned that to “initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an 
43. The United States-led invasion of Afghanistan and then Iraq are the two most obvious contemporary 
examples.
44. Currently, the United Nations is working to address aspects of weapon stockpiling through the Arms 
Trade Treaty, which the U.N. General Assembly adopted on April 2, 2013. This treaty regulates the 
international trade in conventional arms, ranging from assault weapons to battle tanks, combat aircraft, 
and warships. See The Arms Trade Treaty, U.N. Off. Disarmament Aff., http://www.un.org/
disarmament/ATT/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2014); see also Rick Gladstone, Arms Treaty Now Signed by 
Majority of U.N. Members, N.Y. Times (Sept. 25, 2013), http://nyti.ms/1foOnN6 (“The treaty, which 
took seven years to negotiate, is considered by rights advocates to be a landmark document that would 
for the first time impose moral standards on the enormous cross-border trade in conventional arms that 
fuel conflicts around the world . . . .”). Likewise, Gladstone notes that the treaty “is devised to thwart 
sales to users who would break humanitarian law, foment genocide or war crimes, engage in terrorism, 
or kill women and children.” Id.
45. William A. Schabas, Origins of the Criminalization of Aggression: How Crimes Against Peace Became the 
“Supreme International Crime”, in The International Criminal Court and the Crime of 
Aggression 17, 29 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004).
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international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other 
war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”46 
Thus, the tribunal applied a prime mover or first cause rationale to aggression, 
finding that because all other crimes f low from this criminal act, it is the “supreme” 
or perhaps most blameworthy of all international crimes.
 The International Criminal Court (ICC) recognized aggression as one of the four 
core crimes of international law, along with genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity, but unlike with those crimes, it cannot exercise jurisdiction over the crime 
of aggression.47 This agreement has been and continues to be the source of considerable 
academic and political debate.48 Following the Review Conference of the Rome 
Statute in 2010, the ICC may be able to exercise jurisdiction over aggression in 2017.49 
At this conference, the ICC adopted consensus amendments to the Rome Statute that 
prohibit aggression.50 However, the conditions for exercising jurisdiction are onerous 
and may undermine the applicability of this amendment.
 Two processes allow the ICC prosecutor to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression. The more straightforward process involves Article 15ter. Under this 
article, a U.N. Security Council referral to the ICC involving aggression allows the 
prosecutor to initiate an investigation.51 The more complex process involves Article 
15bis. This article addresses situations involving aggression that do not stem from a 
Security Council referral. Under these circumstances, the prosecutor may begin an 
investigation through his or her own motion (proprio motu) only after first referring 
the matter to the Security Council to see if it has determined whether an act of 
aggression exists under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, and then waiting for six 
months.52 Article 15bis also allows states parties to opt-out of the ICC’s jurisdiction 
of aggression by declaring non-acceptance of jurisdiction with the ICC registrar.53 In 
addition, these amendments will not enter into force until at least thirty states parties 
have accepted or ratified the amendments and two-thirds of states parties activate the 
46. Id. at 17–18.
47. Delivering on the Promise of a Fair, Effective and Independent Court: The Crime of Aggression, Coal. Int’l 
Crim. Ct., http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
48. See generally Carrie McDougall, The Crime of Aggression Under the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (2013); Deborah Ruiz Verduzco, Fragmentation of the Rome Statute 
Through an Incoherent Jurisdictional Regime for the Crime of Aggression: A Silent Operation, in The 
Diversification and Fragmentation of International Criminal Law 389–428 (Larissa van 
den Herik & Carsten Stahn eds., 2012).
49. Coal. Int’l Crim. Ct., supra note 47.
50. Id.; see ICC Resolution RC/Res.6 (June 11, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/
Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf.
51. Johan  D.  van  der  Vyver, Prosecuting  the  Crime  of  Aggression  in  the  International  Criminal  Court, 1 U. 
Miami Nat’l Sec. & Armed Conflict L. Rev. 1, 36 (2011).
52. Id. at 34–35.
53. Id. at 43.
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ICC’s jurisdiction over aggression at any time after January 1, 2017.54 To date, thirteen 
states have ratified the amendment.55 More critically, the deference given to the 
Security Council, as well as the ability of states parties to opt-out of the ICC’s 
jurisdiction for this crime, significantly weakens the ICC’s ability to investigate and 
prosecute aggression.
 After VanItch slingshots Grandfather’s Snick-Berry Switch, there is no further 
violation of international humanitarian law during the Yook-Zook conflict, with the 
possible exception of aggression. Although the Yook military clearly demonstrates 
intent in developing weapons to harm Zooks, whether these actions result in 
aggression is uncertain. The Yooks could also claim that their military actions, at least 
initially, constituted legitimate self-defense arising under Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter, which allows for individual self-defense in the case of an armed attack. 
Although moving from the destruction of a Snick-Berry Switch to a possible exchange 
of nuclear or atomic weapons (Boomeroos) is a rather strained argument, international 
law is not unfamiliar with rather creative legal rationales to justify the use of force.56
 Perhaps more troubling is that despite a lack of legal violations under international 
humanitarian law, Yook society nonetheless develops significant animosity toward 
the Zooks. As MacDonald notes, “[A]s the story progresses, the Yooks, who live in 
peaceful coexistence with the Zooks, albeit on opposite sides of a wall, become 
increasingly militant, with brass bands and cheerleaders egging on their military 
heroes.”57 Although the reader sees only one side of the conflict, the same progression 
almost certainly holds true for Zook society regarding the Yooks. The failure of 
international law to address aggression effectively, coupled with the antagonism that 
develops between the Yooks and the Zooks as these societies engage in increasingly 
militaristic behavior, illustrates the limits of the law’s ability to shape positive 
relations between states. Unfortunately, there is no legal system or set of laws that 
can force states to be good neighbors. A legal system can provide a framework that 
54. Id. at 47–48.
55. Status of Ratification and Implementation of the Kampala Amendments on the Crime of Aggression, Global 
Campaign for Ratification & Implementation of Kampala Amendments on Crime of 
Aggression, http://crimeofaggression.info/2012/11/status-of-ratification-and-implementation-of-the-
kampala-amendments-on-the-crime-of-aggression/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
56. The U.S.-U.K. legal argument for invading Iraq is one of the more dubious examples. See, e.g., Owen 
Bowcott, Was the War Legal? Leading Lawyers Give Their Verdict, Guardian (London) (Mar. 2, 2004, 
3:28 EST), http://gu.com/p/heec/tw.
Both George Bush and John Major took the view that [U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 678] did not give them any authority to go to Baghdad or invade Iraq. For 
our government to pin their argument for the use of force on it 12 years later, in a quite 
different situation, seems quite contrary to the wording and spirit of that resolution. It 
has always seemed a desperate attempt [to justify the war] and [] without a second 
resolution in February-March [of 2005], the U.S.-British case did not have the legal 
basis for going to war.
 Id. (statement of Lord Alexander, chairman of the legal organization Justice and past chairman of the 
Bar Council of England and Wales).
57. MacDonald, supra note 12, at 155.
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encourages states to act as good neighbors, but it cannot force states to alter their 
actions when such actions do not violate the law. Likewise, while criticism of the 
ICC is commonplace, it is the political will of a few states, as well as budgetary and 
resource constraints, that hampers numerous international institutions and most 
undermines the ICC’s ability to investigate and prosecute international criminals. In 
one sense, law is ultimately an expression of social and cultural values expressed 
through a political medium. Within international law, if states are unable or unwilling 
to address difficult challenges, such as prosecuting aggression, the blame rests more 
with uncooperative or inept political actors than with legal institutions.
  3. The Threat of Nuclear Weapons
 Within a Yook-Zook-type conflict, international law largely fails to prevent the 
escalation of conflict or the stockpiling of arms, even though the continued amassment 
of military weapons makes the potential conflict that much more devastating. The 
logic behind the continued amassment and technological advancement of military 
weapons reaches its conclusion in nuclear weapons, the use of which promises mutually 
assured destruction, quite appropriately known as “MAD.”58 The Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968) is perhaps the most important legal document 
concerning nuclear weapons.59 This treaty seeks not only to prevent the spread of 
nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon technology, but also the complete disarmament 
of all existing nuclear weapons.60 Thus, this ambitious treaty seeks to address a current 
issue, while also preventing further problems arising from the same issue. Of course, 
implementation has been less than ideal. Of the nine states with nuclear weapon 
capability, only five states are signatory members to the treaty and only three states 
have ratified the treaty.61 As such, this treaty does not provide a strong normative 
commitment from nuclear-capable states that significantly impedes nuclear weapon 
proliferation.
 Just as the international treaty process has not addressed nuclear weapon 
proliferation in a satisfactory way, efforts to constrain the use of nuclear weapons 
under international humanitarian law and efforts to ascertain the legality of nuclear 
weapons under international law have also proved unsatisfactory. For example, 
Additional Protocol I made several notable contributions to international humanitarian 
58. Henry S. Rowen, Introduction to Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its 
Origins and Practice 1, 3–7 (Henry D. Sokolski ed., 2004). Rowen notes, “That we averted disaster 
during the Cold War is considerable evidence in support of Mark Twain’s saying that God protects 
fools, drunkards, and the United States of America.” Id. at 12.
59. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 
729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970).
60. Id.
61. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Status of the Treaty, U.N. Off. Disarmament Aff., 
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (noting that there are 190 states 
parties and 93 signatory states, but that nuclear capable states India, Pakistan, and Israel have not signed 
the treaty).
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law, but it failed to restrict the use of conventional or nuclear weapons.62 Unsurprisingly, 
the United States and other nuclear-capable states sought to retain their military 
advantage and “vigorously and successfully contested” restrictions on the use of 
nuclear weapons.63 The next major development in international humanitarian law, 
the U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) (1981), applies only 
to conventional weapons.64 Accordingly, this treaty does not restrict the use of nuclear 
weapons since chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons remain outside its scope.65 
While the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) organized the 
conference that resulted in Additional Protocol I, the United Nations organized the 
conferences and negotiations that resulted in the CCW.66 Despite different approaches 
taken by different international organizations, the result is the same, as nuclear 
weapons remain outside of the purview of either legal framework.
 In 1996 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) provided an advisory opinion 
that many international legal scholars and practitioners hoped would resolve key 
questions regarding the legality of nuclear weapons. The ICJ’s advisory opinion, 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,67 failed, however, to provide a clear 
answer to whether international law permitted the use of nuclear weapons. Famously, 
or perhaps infamously, the ICJ found that:
The threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules 
of international law applicable in armed conf lict, and in particular the 
principles and rules of humanitarian law[.] However, in view of the current 
state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court 
cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in 
which the very survival of a State would be at stake.68
Three ICJ judges, Mohammed Shahabuddeen, Christopher Weeramantry, and Abdul 
Koroma dissented entirely, finding that no exception, even the very survival of the 
state, provided a legal justification for the use of nuclear weapons.69 Despite these 
dissents, the court found itself deadlocked with seven votes for and seven votes against 
this proposition, thereby leaving this crucial question of international law unresolved.
62. Additional Protocol I, supra note 35.
63. Solis, supra note 29, at 122. Solis also notes that states ratifying Additional Protocol I are required to 
determine whether new weapons would violate Article 36, which forbids employing “arms, projectiles, 
or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering,” but that nuclear weapons are not subject to this 
requirement “presumably because they could not comply with such a test.” Id. at 271.
64. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May 
Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, opened for signature Apr. 10, 
1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Dec. 2, 1983).
65. Solis, supra note 29, at 578.
66. Id.
67. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
68. Id. at 266.
69. Id. at 266–67.
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 In sum, the international treaty process, international humanitarian law, and the 
ICJ have failed to provide legal measures that effectively prohibit or restrict the use of 
nuclear weapons or require nuclear disarmament. Indeed, even the legality of nuclear 
weapons remains inconclusive given the ICJ’s deadlocked decision. It is in this sense 
that Grandfather and VanItch can stand inches from one another while threatening to 
destroy an entire state without violating international law. In practice, a standoff 
similar to that of Grandfather and VanItch would almost certainly garner a response 
from the U.N. Security Council as well as political action. Still, “in view of the current 
state of international law,”70 it is not clear that either Grandfather or VanItch would 
violate international law without unleashing the Boomeroo. Moreover, it is not even 
clear whether releasing a Boomeroo would constitute a violation of international law.
 To many, the inability of international lawyers and judges to prohibit nuclear 
weapons diminishes the credibility of international law, especially as so many people 
throughout the world oppose nuclear weapons.71 To address this issue, the following 
Part explores a vision of international law that is more responsive to ordinary citizens 
by calling for a focus on global citizenship that overrides narrow state interests.
iV.  intErnatiOnaL LaW, COnstrUCting thE OthEr, and a rEnEWEd CaLL 
fOr gLObaL CitizEnship
 As demonstrated in Part III, international law largely fails to provide legal 
sanction that would prevent the escalation of conflict or the use of nuclear weapons. 
This Part discusses how the Yook-Zook conflict illustrates a fundamental problem 
that underpins conflict throughout the world: the transformation of social and cultural 
difference into otherness.72 Otherness contributes to conflict by allowing different 
groups to view one another in a dehumanized manner that makes discrimination and 
even violence socially acceptable. Historically, lawyers and judges have contributed to 
this problem by translating social and political values that reduce difference to 
otherness into law. For example, the 1935 Nuremberg Laws classified German citizens 
as either Germans or Jews, while also depriving Jews of their German citizenship and 
prohibiting marriage or sexual intercourse between these groups.73 As this example 
70. Id. at 266.
71. See, e.g., Lawrence Wittner, Public Mobilization for a Nuclear-Free World, Nuclear Age Peace Found. 
(Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/db_article.php?article_id=148 (noting a 
December 2008 poll consisting of more than 19,000 respondents across twenty-one states in which the 
respondents in twenty states showed strong support to eliminate all nuclear weapons with support 
ranging from 62% to 87%).
72. The concept of otherness appears throughout nineteenth- and twentieth-century continental philosophy. 
Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre all considered this concept, but Emmanuel Levinas offers the 
most thoughtful and detailed inquiry. See generally Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being: Or 
Beyond Essence (Alphonso Lingis trans., 1998) (1974), available at http://chungsoolee.com/files/OB_
wholebook_word.pdf.
73. See The Nazi Germany Sourcebook: An Anthology of Texts 186 (Roderick Stackelberg & Sally 
A. Winkle eds., 2003). Two years earlier, the 1933 Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service 
had already banned civil servants of “non-Aryan descent” from participating in the German Civil 
Service. See id. at 149–52. Thus, German Jews could no longer serve as teachers, judges, or government 
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shows, the law can serve as an instrument of repression by codifying social and 
political values that transform difference into otherness, which in turn denies the 
newly constructed other the rights that the dominant group enjoys.
 Lawyers and judges have also turned the logic of the law against such translations 
to help spur positive social change. A commonly cited example is the Brown v. Board 
of Education74 decision, which held that the establishment of racially segregated 
public schools was unconstitutional.75 In Brown, a unanimous Court concluded that 
“[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal”76 and violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.77 As these examples show, the law 
can serve as an instrument for constructing or deconstructing otherness depending 
on the intent of those applying it. Accordingly, this Part concludes by exploring how 
international law premised on global citizenship, rather than an overly rights-centric 
approach, can resist transforming difference into otherness and provide an 
international legal system more capable of preventing the escalation of conflict and 
the use of nuclear weapons.
 A. Constructing the Other
 While The Butter Battle Book illustrates the failure of international law to halt a 
military strategy that ends with the mutually assured destruction of two states, it 
also illustrates a much more fundamental point regarding human experience: the 
danger of reducing difference to otherness. This section explores the construction of 
otherness by considering the function and symbolic value of the wall, the ideological 
commitments of otherness, and how exclusionary mindsets and social practices both 
reinforce and maintain otherness.
officials. Id. at 150. Previously, former Bavarian Calvary General Konstantin von Gebsattel had 
advocated along with many other prominent Germans to prevent Jews from serving as teachers, judges, 
or government officials in a 1913 document titled The Jewish Question. Id. at 29–30; see also 1 Heinrich 
August Winkler, Germany: The Long Road West 288 (Alexander J. Sager trans., 2006).
These laws demonstrate the concerted effort of the Nazi Party to transform Jewish difference into 
otherness. By using the legislative and judicial systems to legalize these discriminatory social and political 
values, Nazi officials succeeded in cloaking exclusionary and oppressive ideology as legal reform necessary 
for the future of a strong German state. Moreover, even though many Germans no doubt considered 
these laws immoral, within a strong legal tradition such as the German civil law system, the weight of 
official state law was significant and provided a legitimating function that made resistance difficult. 
McGill University law professor Patrick Glenn suggests that there is a strong connection between 
otherness and legal traditions—both positive and negative. Most notably, he argues that traditions 
develop largely through external contact with other traditions. “Concern with identity arises from 
external contact; identity is then constructed by explicit or implicit opposition. The other becomes 
essential in the process of self-understanding. At the same time the other is an ongoing menace to 
internal cohesion.” H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity 
in Law 34 (4th ed. 2010).
74. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
75. Id. at 495.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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  1. The Wall
 While hardened cultural differences may appear as self-evident social norms, 
these norms are often the result of seeing dissimilar peoples and cultures not as 
merely different, but as “other.” Although the norm may seem apparent or always 
existent, specific attitudes, assumptions, and approaches to engaging those different 
from the majority population largely shape this perspective.78 It is in this sense that 
otherness must be constructed.
 The Butter Battle Book demonstrates the construction of otherness most readily 
through the wall that separates the Yooks and the Zooks. Here, the refusal to listen to 
or engage with a different society results in a literal barrier. Within the text, the wall is 
a physical boundary that grows steadily throughout the conflict79 and must be patrolled. 
Constructing a wall to control a population or to gain a military advantage is a 
technique found within both ancient and contemporary practice. The importance of 
the wall within The Butter Battle Book is significant, as the majority of the story unfolds 
at this location. It is here that Grandfather and VanItch struggle for military advantage. 
The wall is also where Grandfather takes his grandson when trying to indoctrinate 
him to the Yook mindset. Lastly, the wall is where the story concludes, as Grandfather 
and VanItch stand atop it and threaten to unleash their respective Boomeroos that 
would destroy both Yook and Zook society. Thus, the wall serves as a physical barrier, 
a key cultural referent, and the site of military and ideological struggle.
 The wall separating the Yooks and the Zooks also invites comparison to other 
barriers. The most obvious comparison is the Berlin Wall, especially considering the 
historical moment at which Seuss completed the book. The fall of the Berlin Wall, 
five years after the book’s publication, marked one of the most significant social and 
political events since World War II and began the reunification of Germany. The 
Berlin Wall was likely the most recognized barrier between peoples, and its 
demolition suggested that the use of walls to resolve conf licts was an outdated 
practice. More recently, technological advances such as high-resolution satellite 
imagery and drone aircraft further suggest that relying on walls to control populations 
is unnecessary, as the ability to monitor people throughout the world increases. 
78. Australian National University law professor Desmond Manderson makes a similar point regarding 
myth in his excellent article From Hunger to Love, which investigates legal interpretation, the tension 
between obedience and responsibility, and the constitution of law through a careful reading of Maurice 
Sendak’s Where the Wild Things Are. See Desmond Manderson, From Hunger to Love: Myths of the Source, 
Interpretation, and Constitution of Law in Children’s Literature, 15 Law & Literature 87 (2003). 
Manderson argues that “myth[s] [aim] to reconcile the contradictory assumptions of a structure or way 
of thinking and, by setting them in some distant past that is before or out of time, to prevent us from 
asking too closely how it is that they got there.” Id. at 88. In addition, he finds that myths “speak of the 
foundational structures and divisions in language and society in a manner that presents them precisely 
as natural or ordained by the gods.” Id. at 88–89.
79. Nel, supra note 5, at 85–86. “The expanding wall dramatizes the growing conflict, while the identical 
houses and trees on either side remind us how much Yooks and Zooks have in common, and consequently 
how little reason they have to go to war.” Id. at 86. Within The Butter Battle Book, Grandfather’s 
recollection of the conf lict begins with the observation that when he began working for the Zook-
Watching Border Patrol, “the Wall wasn’t so high.” Initially the wall does not reach Grandfather’s 
shoulders, while at the text’s conclusion it is three times his height.
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Within armed conf lict, the continued erosion of settled battlefields away from 
civilian populations makes the idea of a fixed wall seem unreflective of contemporary 
conflicts. Likewise, politically motivated crimes that target civilians traveling on 
airplanes,80 working in office buildings,81 staying in hotels,82 and shopping at malls,83 
as well as the retaliation against the actors responsible for such acts,84 also suggest 
that a wall no longer accurately captures politically violent struggles. Indeed, if wars85 
and political violence86 are now truly global, why bother building a wall?
 And yet, walls and barriers persist. Israel’s construction of a wall—or “separation 
barrier” according to Israeli officials—within occupied Palestine is perhaps the most 
recognized and controversial example.87 Israel began building this wall in 2002 
despite much criticism.88 In 2004, the ICJ provided an advisory opinion on the 
legality of the wall. In Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, the ICJ found by a vote of fourteen to one that the wall was 
contrary to international law.89 By the same vote, the court noted that Israel’s 
obligation to terminate its breaches of international law required Israel to cease the 
construction of the wall within occupied Palestinian territory.90 Likewise, the court 
found that Israel had an obligation to make reparations for all damage caused by the 
construction of the wall, characterizing the situation as illegal.91
80. In many respects, the December 21, 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland 
remains the most recognized example of militants targeting civilians on commercial airplanes. See 
Robert D. McFadden, The Crash of Flight 103; Vigils, Tears and Grief for Victims of Disaster, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 23, 1988, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/23/world/the-crash-of-f light-
103-vigils-tears-and-grief-for-victims-of-disaster.html.
81. The September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City provide a particularly 
dramatic example of this type of politically motivated violence.
82. Somini Sengupta, At Least 100 Dead in Indian Terror Attacks, N.Y. Times (Nov. 26, 2008), http://nyti.
ms/WKgrjG.
83. Jeffrey Gettleman & Nicholas Kulish, Gunmen Kill Dozens in Terror Attack at Kenyan Mall, N.Y. Times 
(Sept. 21, 2013), http://nyti.ms/15K7Amy.
84. See, e.g., Robert F. Worth, Drone Strike in Yemen Hits Wedding Convoy, Killing 11, N.Y. Times (Dec. 12, 
2013), http://nyti.ms/IIGlAr.
85. See, e.g., Ari Shapiro, Obama Team Stops Saying “Global War On Terror” But Doesn’t Stop Waging It, NPR: 
It’s All Politics (Mar. 11, 2013, 4:38 PM), http://n.pr/ZBeAhx.
86. See, e.g., Middle East Media Res. Inst., http://www.memriglobaljihadnews.org/ (last visited Mar. 
15, 2014).
87. See generally, René Backmann, A Wall in Palestine (2006).
88. Tami Amanda Jacoby, Bridging the Barrier: Israeli Unilateral Disengagement 25 (2007).
89. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 126, 201 (July 9).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 202.
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 In its reasoning, the court cited numerous international legal instruments, including 
U.N. Charter Article 2(4),92 which prohibits the threat or use of force, and U.N. 
General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV),93 which states that territorial acquisition 
gained through the threat or use of force is illegal. The court also cited international 
humanitarian law, such as the Fourth Geneva Convention,94 and key international 
human rights conventions such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,95 the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,96 and 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.97 Applying these and other international 
legal instruments, the court found that the route of the wall was illegal, as it denied 
Palestinian self-determination and served as a de facto annexation of Palestinian land.98 
The court also found that the construction of the wall violated international law by 
destroying or requisitioning private property, restricting the freedom of movement, 
confiscating agricultural land, denying access to water, and impeding the right to work, 
the right to health, the right to education, and the right to an adequate standard of 
living.99 Finally, the court rejected Israel’s argument that its construction of the wall 
was necessary to attain its security objectives and concluded that Israel cannot rely on 
the right of self-defense to overrule the illegality of the wall.100
 In addition to the ICJ’s conclusion that the wall violated international law, 
numerous individuals and organizations have criticized the construction of the wall. 
The U.N. General Assembly issued a resolution in 2004 demanding “that Israel, the 
occupying Power, comply with its legal obligations as mentioned in the advisory 
opinion.”101 The ICRC also condemned the construction of the wall, stating, “The 
problems affecting the Palestinian population in their daily lives clearly demonstrate 
that [the wall] runs counter to Israel’s obligation under [international humanitarian 
law] to ensure the humane treatment and well-being of the civilian population living 
under its occupation[.]”102 Even former U.S. President George W. Bush, a staunch 
Israel supporter, criticized the wall. In a 2003 White House meeting with Palestinian 
92. Id. at 171.
93. Id. at 171, 199.
94. Id. at 153, 173–76, 183–85, 189, 192, 196.
95. Id. at 172, 177–80, 187–89.
96. Id. at 172, 180–81, 193.
97. Id. at 178, 181.
98. Id. at 181.
99. Id. at 189.
100. Id. at 193 (“The wall, along the route chosen, and its associated régime gravely infringe a number of 
rights of Palestinians residing in the territory occupied by Israel, and the infringements resulting from 
that route cannot be justified by military exigencies or by the requirements of national security or public 
order.”).
101. G.A. Res. ES-10/15, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/15 (Aug. 2, 2004).
102. Red Cross Slams Israel Barrier, BBC News (Feb. 18, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_
east/3498795.stm.
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Authority Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, Bush stated, “I think the wall is a 
problem, and I discussed this with Ariel Sharon. It is very difficult to develop 
confidence between the Palestinians and [the Israelis] with a wall snaking through 
the West Bank.”103
 Despite the illegality of the wall, widespread social and political criticism, and 
great financial cost, the Israeli government continues to construct this wall with 
strong support from the majority of its citizens.104 Israeli support for the wall is in 
part due to the security threats that Israel faces—both imminent and exaggerated. 
Nonetheless, political rhetoric also demonstrates how the wall maintains difference 
that borders on otherness between the militarily dominant Israelis and the 
socioeconomically devastated Palestinians. Most famously, in 1994, then-Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin stated, “This path must lead to a separation . . . . We 
want to reach a separation between us and them.”105 This us-versus-them mentality 
maintains an otherness between Israelis and Palestinians that undermines political 
cooperation and even empathy. Of course, Israelis and Palestinians are different 
peoples with different histories, different social and cultural practices, and, often, 
different religious beliefs. Still, difference does not automatically develop into 
otherness. Obviously, not all Israelis or Palestinians view one another as other, but an 
outspoken minority on both sides succeeds in constructing otherness rather than 
respecting difference. Adopting a perspective that respects difference rather than 
creating and maintaining otherness is a critical first step toward resolving this 
lingering conflict.
 While the Israeli wall in occupied Palestine is the most noted and contested 
barrier, there are also numerous less familiar barriers in use throughout the world that 
serve similar exclusionary and marginalizing purposes. The Moroccan wall within 
Western Sahara controls the border to the last remaining colony in Africa,106 while 
the separation barrier that divides Cyprus into Turkish and Cypriot populations 
essentially creates two states within one geographic territory.107 Perhaps the most apt 
comparison to the Yooks and the Zooks, however, is the Korean Demilitarized Zone 
(DMZ). While the differences between South Korea and North Korea are obviously 
of great significance, as compared to which side of bread one butters, the separation of 
one ethnic people into two populations resonates with the separation of the Yooks and 
103. President Bush Welcomes Prime Minister Abbas to White House, The White House (July 25, 2003), http://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030725-6.html.
104. Jacoby, supra note 88, at 36, 56, 58.
105. Gerald M. Steinberg, Unilateralism and Separation, in The Routledge Handbook of the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict 185, 191 (Joel Peters & David Newman eds., 2013).
106. See generally Toby Shelley, Endgame in the Western Sahara: What Future for Africa’s Last 
Colony? (2004). See also Andrew McConnell, The Last Colony, http://www.andrewmcconnell.com/
index.php/category/the-last-colony (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
107. Nicos Peristianis & John C. Mavris, The ‘Green Line’ of Cyprus: A Contested Boundary in Flux, in The 
Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies 143, 166 (Doris Wastl-Walter ed., 2011) 
(“Following the island-wide division of 1974, the territorial boundary became as firm as that between 
warring sovereign states.”).
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the Zooks, who look remarkably similar and share a common language. The DMZ 
also resonates with the Yook-Zook example because the border serves as a buffer 
between two states neither completely at peace, nor engaged in conflict. The 1953 
Korean Armistice halted military hostilities between North and South Korea until 
the countries could reach a final resolution to the conflict.108 Now, more than sixty 
years later, this resolution remains illusive, as there is concern that armed conflict 
between these states is possible, if not imminent.109 Within The Butter Battle Book, the 
conflict has also endured for a significant period of time, and the Yooks and the 
Zooks similarly remain not quite at peace and not quite at war.
 In addition to maintaining a physical barrier, walls serve an important social 
function by creating easily defined included and excluded groups. Again, the most 
obvious comparison is to the Berlin Wall, often called the “Wall of Shame” by 
Western leaders during the Cold War. Such rhetoric serves a political purpose by 
condemning the leaders on the other side of the wall, but also suggests a social and 
cultural superiority over the people living on the opposite side. Contemporarily, the 
Israeli wall within occupied Palestine is again relevant, as the Israeli government 
refers to the structure as a “security barrier,” while many Palestinians prefer “apartheid 
wall.”110 The U.N. General Assembly and the ICJ refer to the structure simply as a 
“wall,”111 finding this term the most accurate—and likely the most politically neutral.
108. Agreement Between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the One Hand, and the 
Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s 
Volunteers, on the Other Hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea, art. 1, July 27, 1953, 4 
U.S.T. 234 (noting that “[a] demilitarized zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the 
occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities”).
109. Marin Fackler, South Koreans at North’s Edge Cope With Threat of War, N.Y. Times (Apr. 5, 2013), http://
nyti.ms/ZhfzGC (noting that South Koreans interviewed for this article were confident that “the bonds 
of shared ethnicity between the two Koreas would prevail over political differences, and prevent the 
North from following through on its apocalyptic threats”).
110. Richard Rogers & Anat Ben-David, Coming to Terms: A Conflict Analysis of the Usage, in Official and 
Unofficial Sources, of ‘Security Fence’, ‘Apartheid Wall ’, and Other Terms for the Structure Between Israel and 
the Palestinian Territories, 3 Media, War & Conflict 202, 203 (2010).
The construction of the obstacle in the West Bank has added a new layer to the conflict, 
and to the disputed terminological landscape. Whilst the arguing parties invent and 
employ different terms to refer to the obstacle, media sources and other actors striving 
to take non-positions in the conflict, yet provide an accurate description, face difficulties 
in finding the right term to name the structure. Across the media landscape, including 
governmental, inter-governmental and NGO sources, the words ‘fence’, ‘wall ’ and 
‘barrier’ are combined with the descriptive terms ‘security’, ‘separation’, ‘apartheid’, 
‘anti-terrorist’, ‘West Bank’ and a few others.
 Id. See also, Nigel Parry, Is It a Fence? Is It a Wall? No, It’s a Separation Barrier, Electronic Intifada 
(Aug. 1, 2003), http://electronicintifada.net/content/it-fence-it-wall-no-its-separation-barrier/4715.
111. See G.A. Res. ES-10/15, supra note 101, ¶ 5 (deciding “to reconvene to assess the implementation of the 
present resolution, with the aim of ending the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the 
wall and its associated regime in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem”) 
(emphasis added). In addition, two previous Emergency Session Resolutions also refer to the “structural 
barrier” as a wall. See G.A. Res. ES-10/13, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/13 (Oct. 21, 2003) 
(demanding that “Israel stop and reverse the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
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 The above examples show how constructing a barrier between peoples is not only 
physically divisive, but also reinforces difference in a manner that invites otherness. 
Indeed, even naming the “wall” can contribute to maintaining an antagonism 
between those living on either side of the barrier. Moreover, by eliminating or 
restricting interaction between peoples, these barriers deny individuals the 
opportunity to share basic commonalities with those different from themselves. 
Doing so removes the human element from the conflict and makes exclusionary 
views, and even violence, more likely.
  2. Ideological Commitments of Otherness
 Constructing otherness requires particular ideological commitments and The 
Butter Battle Book does not shy away from criticizing such beliefs. As educator and 
author Rita Roth notes, there are several ideological positions within the text that 
readers could challenge such as “leaders make reasoned judgments for the good of 
society,” “technology resolves all problems,” “cultural difference is to be abhorred,” 
and “nationalism supersedes all other considerations.”112 Roth’s insights demonstrate 
that The Butter Battle Book is not simply a cautionary tale addressing the escalation of 
conflict or a parable demonstrating the absurdity of nuclear weapon proliferation and 
mutually assured destruction. While it certainly succeeds in these modes, The Butter 
Battle Book is better understood as an illustration of a fundamental breakdown in 
civil society and cross-cultural dialogue. Indeed, what is most striking about the 
military escalation between the Yooks and the Zooks is not the elegant logic of arms 
escalation that results in two societies ready to destroy one another, but how the 
simple refusal to treat a different culture with dignity, respect, or even basic tolerance 
makes this logic possible. Most tellingly, the reader never learns why buttering one’s 
bread up or down even matters. There is no historical, social, or cultural explanation 
for this difference or any explication of the great importance that both Yooks and 
Zooks place on maintaining this difference. Rather, the difference simply is.
 The Butter Battle Book illustrates how ideological commitments lead to the 
construction of otherness both by what the text excludes and by what it includes. For 
example, just as the importance of bread buttering is not explained, at no point in the 
text do the Yooks and the Zooks engage in dialogue or attempt to understand the one 
Territory”) (emphasis added); G.A. Res. ES-10/14, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/14 (Dec. 8, 2003) (stating 
that the General Assembly is “[g]ravely concerned at the commencement and continuation of 
construction by Israel, the occupying Power, of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including 
in and around East Jerusalem, which is in departure from the Armistice Line of 1949, Green Line, and 
which has involved the confiscation and destruction of Palestinian land and resources, the disruption of 
the lives of thousands of protected civilians and the de facto annexation of large areas of territory, and 
underlining the unanimous opposition by the international community to the construction of that 
wall ”) (emphasis added).
112. Rita Roth, On Beyond Zebra with Dr. Seuss, in Of Sneetches and Whos and the Good Dr. Seuss: 
Essays on the Writings and Life of Theodor Geisel, supra note 2, at 141, 149.
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difference that divides their otherwise strikingly similar-looking societies.113 In 
contrast, the text shows how propaganda contributes to the construction of otherness 
by creating a negative and essentialized version of a different society. Thus, the Yook 
banner on the wall that proclaims “Yooks are not Zooks” reminds Yook society of its 
irreconcilable difference with the Zooks and the logical impossibility of accepting 
“Zookness.” Likewise, the Zook “Butter Side DOWN!” poster featured prominently 
in the Zook home suggests a deeply ingrained social acceptance of Yook as other.
 The use of military uniforms also contributes to the construction of otherness, as 
demonstrated by Grandfather and VanItch wearing increasingly ornate uniforms as the 
conflict progresses.114 These distinctive uniforms remind Yook and Zook society that an 
important value is at stake. Military uniforms serve various purposes, but the most 
obvious function is to demarcate civilians from military personnel. Indeed, distinguishing 
lawful combatants from non-combatants is perhaps the fundamental legal norm of 
international humanitarian law, and requiring parties to a conflict to have “a fixed 
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance” helps uphold this crucial distinction.115 By 
making opposing combatants aware of which members of a population are combatants 
and which members are civilians, uniforms protect civilians. Military uniforms also 
carry a decorum intended to create feelings of admiration, respect, and at times, 
intimidation. Likewise, who wears military uniforms in a given society speaks 
significantly to that society’s values. In militarized societies, more people may wear 
uniforms as the military encompasses a greater role within social life.116 In this regard, 
with their “pretty new uniform” and “spiffy new suit,” Grandfather and VanItch reflect 
the increasing militarization of Yook and Zook society and how such societies tend to 
view different as other.
  3. Exclusionary Mindsets and Reinforcing Social Practices
 Otherness requires creating and maintaining a particular mindset that privileges 
some people at the expense of others. Seemingly innocuous social practices can 
contribute to creating such a mindset. Family relationships can also contribute, 
113. MacDonald, supra note 12, at 157–58 (noting that Seuss was quite clear in his strategy for writing the 
book, stating, “What I was trying to say was that the Yooks and the Zooks were intrinsically the same. 
The more I made them different, the more I was defeating the story.”).
114. In addition to a new weapon, Grandfather receives a “fancier suit” that makes him feel “much bigger” after 
VanItch destroys his Snick-Berry Switch. VanItch receives a “spiffy new suit” when he outmaneuvers the 
Triple-Sling Jigger, while Grandfather receives a “pretty new uniform” and promotion to general before 
the Utterly Sputter mission commences.
115. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4(A)(2)(b), opened for signature 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).
116. For example, General Jorge Ubico ruled Guatemala from 1931 until 1944 through what Latin American 
history scholar Jim Handy describes as “a carefully measured blend of terror and paternalism.” Jim Handy, 
Resurgent Democracy and the Guatemalan Military, 18 J. Latin Am. Stud. 383, 387 (1986). General 
Ubico militarized numerous aspects of Guatemalan society, including giving the members of the 
Guatemalan Symphony Orchestra military ranks and forcing them to wear military uniforms. Id. at 388.
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especially given the very personal nature of these relationships and the family unit’s 
ability to reproduce social and cultural values.
 In The Butter Battle Book, the story begins with Grandfather’s attempt to create 
an exclusionary mindset in his grandson. Grandfather acts with a clear belief in Yook 
superiority. As Pease notes, “The grandfather believes that he must inculcate the 
proper understanding in his grandson, so he informs him that it’s high time he knew 
‘[o]f the terribly horrible things that the Zooks do.’”117 Exclusionary mindsets are 
atypical to children and generally require the inculcation that Pease describes. As 
MacDonald notes, “Unless a child learns otherwise, the sameness of all sorts of 
people is more apparent than the differences.”118 Perhaps it is the grandson’s ability to 
see sameness where adults see difference that led Seuss to begin and end The Butter 
Battle Book from his perspective, even though the majority of the story unfolds 
through Grandfather’s retelling of the Yook-Zook conflict. Interestingly, while the 
grandson is vital to the story’s plot and its unresolved conclusion, he is absent from 
most of the story. After the opening scene, the grandson disappears while Grandfather 
narrates the conflict’s history. The grandson only reemerges to assert his voice at the 
end of the story during the zenith of the conflict. He also stands apart from all other 
characters in the book because of his youthful innocence. Arguably, it is this 
innocence that allows him to refrain from blindly adhering to the Yook mindset. In 
contrast, Grandfather, his nemesis VanItch, Chief Yookeroo, and the Boys in the 
Back Room all believe steadfastly in their cause and their actions, even though these 
actions escalate the conf lict, increase the likelihood of violence, and raise the 
possibility of the eradication of Yook and Zook society.
 Yook society also plays an important role in the escalation of the conf lict. 
MacDonald argues that Yook society is the force most responsible for escalating the 
conflict, finding “the sentiment of the general Yook population” to be “the more 
invidious threat” compared to the other actors within the story.119 Continuing, she 
writes that it is the Yook population that taunts Grandfather when he fails, forms 
marching bands and cheerleader squads, “make[s] the issue more than just a border 
skirmish,” and “invoke[s] issues of honor in their songs.”120 She concludes that:
If only the Yook grandfather and Van Itch had been left alone to patrol the border 
armed with slingshots and stickle-bush whips, the issue might have remained 
isolated and might have been forgotten. But with the interest of the entire Yook 
populace, the quality of the rhetoric and weaponry escalates to extremes.121
 Although MacDonald’s interpretation seems to place too much emphasis on the 
role of Yook society, while not allocating enough responsibility to individuals or the 
Yook military leadership for escalating the conflict, it does demonstrate the pervasive 
117. Pease, supra note 1, at 145–46 (emphasis added).
118. MacDonald, supra note 12, at 158.
119. Id. at 160.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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influence that society can have on maintaining otherness. Moreover, her interpretation 
also underscores the disrupting action that the grandson’s interjection has on the 
narrative. The grandson, again perhaps because of his naiveté, is the only individual 
to question the logic of escalating the conflict.
 Social practices contribute to the construction of otherness in various ways. 
Within The Butter Battle Book, social practices maintain otherness by reinforcing 
essentialized views of the other. Seuss displays this process throughout the text, as 
public support becomes increasingly visible as the story progresses, thereby matching 
the conflict’s escalation. Thus, while the initial encounters between Grandfather and 
VanItch do not garner a public response, later encounters show a Yook crowd 
enthusiastically cheering on Grandfather—“Fight! Fight for Butter Side Up! Do or 
Die!” The phrase “Do or Die!” demonstrates the intensity of public support and 
underscores the either/or, us/them mindset of Yook society.122 The Right-Side-Up 
Song Girls and Butter Up Band also illustrate the use of social practices to produce a 
somewhat less overt reminder of Zook otherness. The Right-Side-Up Song Girls 
wear matching uniforms, f ly f lags with a depiction of butter side up toast, and 
remind Yook society to “Oh, be faithful! Believe in thy butter!”123 Finally, Seuss 
demonstrates the lasting impression that social practices can have by showing that 
even after Chief Yookeroo commands all Yooks to move to the underground shelter, 
the head of the Yook procession still carries a Right-Side Butter-Up flag.124
 While constructing otherness requires creating distinct groups, this process 
requires more than simply separating individuals into various sets. Rather, the 
creation of groups requires a relational function that privileges one group at the 
expense of devaluing another. Thus, it is not simply that two unequal groups coexist, 
but that a dominant group views a marginalized group as inferior. Ethnic conflicts 
are rife with such examples, even if the ethnicities involved in the conf lict are 
politically constructed manipulations.125 Accordingly, creating an either/or, us/them 
dichotomy is a key aspect of the othering process.
122. Seuss also depicts Yooks standing on the roofs of their houses and cheering Grandfather as he races to 
the wall in the Utterly Sputter.
123. Interestingly, the Right-Side-Up Song Girls are the first female characters within the story.
124. This image is striking. As the long Yook progression moves dutifully toward the Yookery, Yook faces 
express shock and fear. Nonetheless, while racing to the wall, Grandfather notices that “every last Yook 
in our land was obeying our Chief Yookeroo’s grim command: They were all bravely marching, with 
banners af lutter, down a hole! For their country! And Right-Side-Up Butter!”
125. Essentializing Hutus and Tutsis ethnicity leading up to the Rwandan Genocide is perhaps the most 
notable contemporary example. See Moise Jean, The Rwandan Genocide: The True Motivations for Mass 
Killings, Emory Endeavors in World Hist., 2007, at 10, available at http://www.history.emory.edu/
home/assets/documents/endeavors/volume1/Moises.pdf.
The ethnic myths that established the relationship between the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, 
along with the mass hostility toward the Tutsi, economic distress, the chauvinistic 
political mobilization of the northern Hutu, and the resulting security dilemma of the 
RPF [Rwandan Patriotic Front], made Rwanda a fertile ground for such a genocidal 
atrocity that occurred.
 Id.
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 In her essay on diversity within Dr. Seuss and Philosophy, Tanya Jeffcoat refers to 
this relational function as “normative hubris,”126 which she defines as “the arrogance 
that assumes that one way—OUR way—is the best way, not only for ourselves but 
for everyone else.”127 Jeffcoat expands on this point by contrasting cultural difference 
with normative hubris.
[T]here is a difference between noticing that different communities drive on 
different sides of the road and making the claim that WE drive on the correct 
side of the road (or the more logical or morally superior side) and that everyone 
who does differently is wrong, illogical, mentally warped, or immoral, even if 
that way of doing things works just fine.128
Jeffcoat also discusses several possible options when we encounter the other. Some options 
are positive, as we can choose to “form friendships despite our differences.”129 Conversely, 
some options are negative, as we can chose to “shrink back in fear and work to maintain 
our distance.”130 Jeffcoat also notes the possibility of exploitation when encountering the 
other, where we treat the other “as a thing or an object for our benefit.”131
 Like Jeffcoat, legal theorist Desmond Manderson considers the problem of 
encountering the other. Through his reading of Where the Wild Things Are, Manderson 
shows how that story’s protagonist, Max, moves from legal obedience to legal 
responsibility.132 Manderson relies on French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas to show 
the ethical inadequacy of mere obedience and how to respond to otherness responsibly.133 
While otherness treats difference as morally wrong and socially unacceptable, Levinas 
126. Tanya Jeffcoat, From There to Here, From Here to There: Diversity Is Everywhere, in Dr. Seuss and 
Philosophy: Oh, the Thinks You Can Think! 93, 94 (Jacob M. Held ed., 2011).
127. Id.
128. Id. MacDonald makes a similar observation, noting that between the Yooks and the Zooks, buttering 
bread differently is not simply a different way of doing things, but that “[t]he issue of buttering bread 
becomes one of national pride and honor, to be fought over to the death.” MacDonald, supra note 12, 
at 155.
129. Jeffcoat, supra note 126, at 95.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Manderson, supra note 78, at 99. Initially, Max’s reproduction of the law as obedience makes him feel 
dispirited. Id. at 114. Indeed, by reproducing his mother’s command and forcing the wild things to stop 
their rumpus and sending them off to bed without supper, Max becomes lonely and unhappy. Id. at 114, 
119. To move from crisis to civility, Max must exchange his wolf suit for domestication, since love and 
citizenship are correlative. Id. at 120. Thus, “the promise of obedience in exchange for love establishes 
something like a social contract.” Id. at 121.
133. See Siby K. George, Hospitality as Openness to the Other: Levinas, Derrida, and the Indian Hospitality 
Ethos, 15 J. Hum. Values 29 (2007). George compares Levinas’s concept of welcoming the other as an 
act of “authentic openness” to India’s spirit of hospitality and tolerance. Id. at 30, 34, 37. Moreover, he 
notes that “[a]s the world becomes smaller in proportion to the expanding processes of globalization, 
openness to the other person as hospitality, regardless of social values imposed on her [or him], is a 
tremendous ethical value.” Id. at 42.
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stresses the need “to respect difference and not to obliterate it.”134 Thus, difference—not 
sameness—is “the necessary condition of any enduring relationship within a 
community.”135 Legal responsibility requires this “recognition of difference,” since “the 
necessity of continually making judgments that attend to that difference [] marks the 
end of the possibility of unquestioning obedience and the true dawn of responsibility.”136
 Manderson’s reading of Where the Wild Things Are resonates strongly with this 
article’s reading of The Butter Battle Book. Importantly, Manderson notes the tension 
between thinking of the law as obedience (“the suspension of judgment”) and as 
responsibility (“the exercise of judgment”).137 Moreover, he observes the ethical 
inadequacy of mere obedience. “Obedience removes the obligation to think, and in 
particular to think of others.”138 This observation is telling, as it certainly describes 
the mindset of Grandfather, VanItch, Chief Yookeroo, and to some extent all Yooks 
and Zooks depicted in the text with the exception of the grandson. This 
characterization of obedience also describes the now-rejected defense of respondeat 
superior in international humanitarian law.139 This defense, commonly characterized 
as “ just following orders,” required judges to find a defendant making a successful 
respondeat superior claim not guilty, and instead shift the criminal liability upward 
to the defendant’s supervisor who issued the orders.140 This defense no longer excuses 
individual responsibility in international humanitarian law, but it may serve as a 
mitigating factor during sentencing.141 Most importantly, Manderson’s distinction 
between obedience and responsibility details the construction of otherness between 
the Yooks and the Zooks. The Yooks and the Zooks strive to erase difference and 
create total sameness, thereby evading responsibility and a legal ethic that requires 
the vastly more difficult task of exercising judgment as opposed to simply following 
the law or following orders.
 Both Jeffcoat and Manderson illustrate that the construction of otherness can 
allow for the dehumanization of the opposing society.142 As Jeffcoat notes, “In 
134. Manderson, supra note 78, at 122.
135. Id. at 123.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 115.
138. Id. at 124.
139. See, e.g., Jeanne L. Bakker, The Defense of Obedience to Superior Orders: The Mens Rea Requirement, in 1 
Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes 441, 443 
(Neal J. Kritz ed., 1995) (“Even as late as 1961, when the weight of authority no longer supported the 
respondeat superior doctrine, Nazi fugitive Adolf Eichmann maintained (successfully) that as the 
recipient of orders, he was immune from responsibility and guilt[.]”).
140. Id. at 442.
141. Id. at 449 (noting that Article 8 of the International Military Tribunal did not free a defendant following 
the orders of a superior from responsibility, but “may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the 
Tribunal determines that justice so requires”).
142. See also Roth, supra note 112, at 148 (noting that The Butter Battle Book “examines the folly of xenophobia 
and dehumanization that can grow out of an overdependence on technology”).
647
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 58 | 2013/14
treating the Other as somehow less than, we take the first step toward exploitation 
and dehumanization.”143 The promise of international law, especially international 
human rights law, is to refuse otherness while respecting difference. International 
human rights law denies that any individual can be treated “as somehow less than.”144 
Although international law does not always uphold this promise, it does provide an 
important aspirational standard that most actors respect. The following section 
discusses whether a more progressive international law could better refuse the 
construction of otherness than current international law. Moreover, it explores how 
this reformulation would differ from the current understanding and practice of 
international law.
 B. Refusing the Construction of Otherness Through a Progressive International Law
 How can international law, a decentralized, highly complex, and constantly 
evolving regulatory and adjudicative legal system refuse the construction of otherness? 
This section addresses this question by examining the importance of cross-cultural 
dialogue and discussing two examples of a more progressive international law.
  1. The Importance of Cross-Cultural Dialogue
 Perhaps most significantly, international law can foster constructive cross-
cultural dialogue to address specific legal issues that arise from social and political 
disputes. By addressing these disputes before they harden into intractable positions, 
conflict becomes less likely and the consequences of conflict less severe. Diplomacy 
provides the best forum for cross-cultural dialogue within the international legal 
system and therefore provides the best opportunity to engage in discussion that 
ultimately prevents conf lict. The United Nations recognizes the importance of 
“preventive diplomacy,” which U.N. officials define as “diplomatic action taken to 
prevent disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of conflicts 
when they occur.”145 By seeking to engage disputing states through a variety of 
international and regional organizations, the U.N. preventive diplomacy model 
encourages “dialogue, compromise and the peaceful resolution of tensions.”146 This 
model notes several recent successes including helping to ensure the 2011 South 
Sudan independence referendum proceeded as planned and helping to quell rising 
tensions between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2008.147
143. Jeffcoat, supra note 126, at 95.
144. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 1 
(Dec. 10, 1948) (“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed 
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”).
145. Preventive Diplomacy Report: Q&A, U.N. Dep’t Pol. Aff., http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/
undpa/main/issues/preventive_diplomacy/qa_preventive (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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 As discussed above, of all the actions that the Yooks and the Zooks take 
throughout the conf lict, the one action that they do not undertake is simple 
conversation. Certainly, it would seem easier to discuss why buttering bread on the 
top or on the bottom creates such impassioned feelings of moral correctness compared 
to planning for chemical warfare (the Utterly Sputter) or a nuclear attack (the Bitsy 
Big-Boy Boomeroo) that forces the Yook—and presumably Zook—population to 
retreat to an underground bunker. There are of course no Yook or Zook diplomats 
within the story, and throughout the text there is no real dialogue between the Yooks 
and the Zooks. The only communication between Yook and Zook society is the 
back-and-forth threats offered by Grandfather and VanItch, communication that is 
anything but constructive. Accordingly, diplomacy could provide a useful approach 
to resolving the conflict, or at least preventing its escalation. Diplomacy is one of the 
oldest forms of international law,148 and taking the simple first step of having a 
discussion may help to prevent violence. Of course, diplomacy may fail to resolve 
conflict, but diplomatic conversation at least attempts to prevent violence. At the 
very least, diplomatic conversation slows the march toward armed conflict.
 Perhaps a larger problem is the inability of state diplomacy to represent the views 
of ordinary citizens. Diplomats are state officials and they represent the views of the 
state. At best, diplomats represent ordinary citizens through promoting political and 
policy values that they endorse through their elected officials. At worst, the 
government views promulgated by diplomats fail to represent the values and concerns 
of ordinary citizens entirely. In practice, the truth is somewhere in between. The 
next section looks at two examples that attempt to reduce this democratic deficit 
between state and citizen.
  2. Toward a Progressive Model of International Law
 Outside of diplomacy, how could international law intervene in a Yook-Zook-
type conflict before threats turn to violence? One possibility is to reshape international 
law to make it more accessible to all states and all people. This section argues that 
reconstructing international law to focus foremost on human dignity and global 
citizenship,149 and conversely less on strong state sovereignty and a rigid rights-based 
approach to law, will make international law more accessible to more people. Two 
approaches that attempt to reconstruct international law in this manner—thereby 
making inclusive global citizenship the core principle of international law—are a 
Global Peoples Assembly proposed by professors Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, 
and the jurisprudential approach of former ICJ judge Christopher Weeramantry.
148. Geraldo E. do Nascimento e Silva, Diplomatic and Consular Relations, in International Law: 
Achievements and Prospects 437 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991) (noting that one commentator 
concludes “diplomacy is as old as nations themselves”); see also Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 
opened for signature Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force Apr. 24, 1964) 
(“Recalling that peoples of all nations from ancient times have recognized the status of diplomatic agents[.]”).
149. See also Manderson, supra note 78, at 100–01 (“Love and responsibility emerge in our lives together; we 
cannot be good legal citizens without them.”).
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   a. A Global Peoples Assembly
 Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss first proposed a “Global Peoples Assembly” in 
2000.150 Falk and Strauss began this ambitious project by asking a simple question: 
“If democracy is so appropriate in the nation-state setting, why should not democratic 
procedures and institutions be extended to the global setting?”151 Indeed, if one takes 
democracy seriously and believes that it is the best or the most legitimate form of 
governance, to allow non-democratic procedures to dominate international law and 
international relations is nonsensical and hypocritical.
 Falk and Strauss argue that a Global Peoples Assembly (GPA) is a conceptual 
possibility that is feasible and deserves serious consideration. They base this argument 
on the accomplishments of global civil society throughout the 1990s, citing the role 
of civil society in establishing the U.N. Climate Change Convention (1992),152 the 
Convention Outlawing Anti-Personnel Land Mines (1997),153 and the Rome Statute 
that led to the creation of the International Criminal Court (1998).154 To Falk and 
Strauss, each example demonstrates that, albeit imperfect, global civil society “is 
capable of promoting significant global reform.”155 Relatedly, Falk and Strauss claim 
that a GPA could succeed as “popular sovereignty” is increasingly seen as “the 
foundation for governmental legitimacy in today’s world.”156 Finding that classic 
sovereignty and state consent are outdated, they argue for “contemporary sovereignty” 
that reconciles the state system with democracy and human rights.157 Most 
importantly, they argue that it is the citizen that forms the basis for political and 
legal legitimacy. “Because the citizenry rather than the sovereign is the fundamental 
source of political authority, citizens can bypass their sovereign intermediaries and 
act directly to create an international organization.”158
 Structurally, Falk and Strauss envision the GPA working similarly to the U.N. 
General Assembly.159 They provide a scenario where the GPA would eventually 
attract state participation and perhaps become even more influential than the United 
Nations.160 Criticizing current international organizations, Falk and Strauss 
emphasize the lack of citizen participation in these organizations, as well as their 
150. Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of 
Popular Sovereignty, 36 Stan. J. Int’l L. 191 (2000); see also Andrew Strauss, Overcoming the Dysfunction of 
the Bifurcated Global System: The Promise of a Peoples Assembly, 9 Transnat’l Contemp. Probs. 489 (1999).
151. Falk & Strauss, supra note 150, at 191 (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 196–99.
153. Id. at 199–201.
154. Id. at 201–03.
155. Id. at 203.
156. Id. at 206–07.
157. Id. at 208.
158. Id. at 209.
159. Id. at 211.
160. Id.
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dearth of accountability to the global citizenry. In contrast, they argue that citizens 
want to participate, and international organizations recognize that without greater 
citizen participation their actions will continue to lose legitimacy.161 Finally, they 
argue that citizen participation could create law in a number of ways, such as a 
“spiraling effect” that would eventually transform non-binding resolutions into 
binding international law.162
 Despite the novelty of this argument, Falk and Strauss are not overly idealistic or 
utopian in their proposal. Indeed, they spend considerable time detailing possible 
difficulties that a GPA would entail, such as logistics and cost.163 At the same time, 
they remain confident that sufficient commitment can overcome these challenges.164
   b. A Truly Universal International Law
 Like Falk and Strauss, former ICJ judge Christopher Weeramantry advocates for 
a more inclusive version of international law. In 2004, Weeramantry published 
Universalising International Law,165 in which he discusses his inclusive approach to 
international law.166 Weeramantry’s text demonstrates a comprehensive understanding 
and appreciation of international law, which one would expect from a former ICJ 
judge. Interestingly, and less expectedly, Weeramantry raises points similar to those 
raised by Falk and Strauss regarding the role of the global citizenry in international 
law. Noting that the sources of international law are rather narrow, Weeramantry 
argues that certain sentiments shared by the majority of people in the world deserve 
recognition as law.167 “Vox populi has special sanctity in the language of politics. Vox 
humanitatis should have that sanctity in the discourse of international law.”168 He 
points to nuclear weapons as an example where “the voice of humanity speaks out 
loud and clear but yet international law takes no note of it.”169 Rejecting the 
proposition that states alone may speak for individuals within international law, he 
proposes that an “opinio humanitatis” be considered a source of law.170 As international 
law professor Roger Clark observes, Weeramantry put this proposition into practice 
during his time on the ICJ bench. “In his dissent to the Court’s advisory opinion in 
161. Id. at 211–13.
162. Id. at 216.
163. Id. at 218.
164. Id.
165. C.G. Weeramantry, Universalising International Law (2004).
166. For a concise, but excellent review of Weeramantry’s book that includes a reference to The Butter Battle 
Book, see Roger S. Clark, Recent Books on International Law, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 298, 298–302 (2005). 
See id. at 300–01 nn.10–11 for The Butter Battle Book reference.
167. Weeramantry, supra note 165, at 145.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 146; see also id. at 205 (“The entire concept of sovereignty needs careful reappraisal in the context 
of the future needs of international law.”).
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the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons . . . Judge Weeramantry took note 
of well over three million signatures on declarations of public conscience concerning 
nuclear weapons,” which he described as “not without legal relevance.”171
 In addition to extending the sources of international law and taking the global 
citizenry seriously, Weeramantry advocates for using international law as an 
instrument of peace. Indeed, he makes four suggestions for using international law to 
pursue peace that are directly relevant to The Butter Battle Book: stressing legal 
prevention rather than cure,172 emphasizing duties rather than remaining preoccupied 
with rights,173 addressing intergenerational rights,174 and abolishing nuclear 
weapons.175 The common theme throughout these suggestions is to make international 
law more inclusive and more equitable. In the context of The Butter Battle Book, Falk 
and Strauss’s GPA or Weeramantry’s inclusive approach to international law would 
likely resolve the conflict before it approaches anything near the potentially deadly 
ending that Seuss describes. At the very least, these possibilities would allow ordinary 
Yook and Zook citizens the ability to discuss the conf lict and its escalation, a 
discussion entirely lacking in Seuss’s text.
V. COnCLUsiOn
 The Butter Battle Book demonstrates, perhaps above all else, the negative 
consequences that the construction of otherness entails. The inability of the Yooks or 
the Zooks to treat cultural difference with respect results in a military standoff that 
threatens the very existence of both societies. Through the absurdity of the dispute, 
the text illustrates the danger of blindly obeying the state, as well as the harmful 
consequences of exclusionary and inflexible ideologies.176
 Seuss completed The Butter Battle Book thirty years ago, and while the threat of 
full-f ledged nuclear war has lessened, the construction of otherness continues to 
create inequality, suffering, and conf lict throughout the world. Currently, 
international law does not meet its promise of refusing the construction of otherness. 
Reconstructing international law to be more inclusive and more likely to spur 
constructive cross-cultural dialogue is necessary to fulfill this promise. This 
reformulation will not be easy, but the examples provided by Falk, Strauss, 
Weeramantry, and others177 suggest that it can be done. Until then, we must continue 
171. Clark, supra note 166, at 299 n.3.
172. Weeramantry, supra note 165, at 412–13.
173. Id. at 414.
174. Id. at 416–17.
175. Id. at 423–24. The prohibition of nuclear weapons is extremely important to Weeramantry as 
demonstrated by his dissent in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons and his decision to 
conclude this text with a lengthy chapter that treats nuclear weapons very critically. Id. at 462–520.
176. Pease, supra note 1, at 144 (“The madness of taking up intractable positions was one of his favorite 
topics for the books that Dr. Seuss wrote during the cold war.”).
177. See, e.g., Sienho Yee, Towards an International Law of Co-Progressiveness (2004). Yee 
describes “human f lourishing” as the ultimate goal of the international law of co-progressiveness. Id. at 
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to dismantle the construction of otherness and remember that as global citizens we 
have the power and the ethical obligation to do so.
23, 26. Moreover, Yee notes that the international law of co-progressiveness “is all encompassing, 
preoccupied with advancements in moral and ethical terms” and a law that “will no doubt help to make 
the world a better one.” Id. at 26.
